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There are 7-year primary and 5-year high schools in
Argentina, of which 9 years of education is compulsory.
The high school is divided into different fields of
study. Almost 80% of young people go to high school and 48%
take higher education. Higher education is offered in public
and private universities and colleges. In 2000, Argentina
had approx. 1.7 million students. See TOPSCHOOLSINTHEUSA for TOEFL, ACT, SAT testing locations and high school codes in Argentina.
The Argentine school system has in many ways succeeded in
building a national identity. However, there is still
conflict between the radicals, who want a liberal education,
and the Peronists, who want a Catholic- based school.
The quality of education varies greatly. About. 20% of
schools are private, most often Catholic, and these are,
with few exceptions, the best schools in the country. Public
schools usually have poorer educated teachers and poor
equipment. Illiteracy is estimated to be approx. 3% (2000).
Universities
The University of Buenos Aires (UBA) was established in
1821 and includes thirteen faculties, six hospitals and ten
museums.
Coup and reaction
After 1950, prices of agricultural commodities on the
world market began to fall, and industrial citizenship,
which required more capital to expand, could no longer
obtain it through the tapping of agricultural exports. Thus,
the pressure on the working class increased, and while real
wages for industrial workers increased by 70% from 1945 to
1949, they decreased by 25% from 1949 to 1953. Perón thought
that nationalism became too costly in the long run, and in
1953 provided increased access for foreign investment in
important industrial sectors, while starting negotiations
with Standard Oil of California on oil extraction in
Patagonia. In doing so, Perón withdrew from the nationalist
sectors of the military, while opening up abroad was not
sufficient for the industrial citizenship that had
previously supported Perón. The lack of domestic financing
now made the majority of this bourgeoisie feel better served
to go into direct alliance with foreign capital interests.
Dissatisfaction in the working class was increasing, and
when Perón was at the same time at odds with the former
Allied Catholic Church - by allowing divorce and public
prostitution - too many of his alliance partners had
disappeared. In 1955, therefore, the most imperially allied
sectors of the armed forces - first and foremost the navy -
could lead to a coup with support from the major landlords,
who had largely retained their positions of power through
the ten years of peronist rule, and from large sections of
industrial and trade bourgeoisie. Large sections of the
working class continued to support Perón, but although some
required weapons to defend their leader, they were not
organized to confront the military. Perón found it wise to
flee to Paraguay without taking up the fight. Later he went
to Spain in exile. Developments in Argentina show how an
imperialist allied citizenship is being transformed into a
massively repressive military regime - all the while
preserving its rule and imperialism.
The 1955 coup was aimed at the working class and
nationalist interests. For the coup makers, the peronist
movement was the most important expression of both of them.
The Peronist Party was banned. The coup makers intervened in
the peronistically-dominated trade union organization CGT,
and hundreds of union leaders were arrested. Economic policy
after 1955 was, of course, taking care of the interests of
the large industry and landlords. Devaluations were carried
out to the benefit of the export industries and domestic
prices of agricultural commodities were sharply raised. With
this national transfer of revenue to agriculture, the
capital injection to the industrial bourgeoisie had to be
secured in another way. This was done by opening the country
to foreign capital, which flowed in, and later to pull large
values out of the country again. In order to increase
exports, domestic consumption had to be reduced, which of
course went beyond the wider strata. Accordingly, after
1955, the share of national product declined rapidly and
real wages fell accordingly.
Contradictions in the trade union movement
Within the trade union movement, a clear contradiction
developed during the period 46-55, which later became
crucial to the political struggle of the working class - the
contradiction between those who stand for a line of
cooperation and will accept the rules laid down by the state
power in order to gain short-term economic benefits, and
those who stand for a battle line and refuse any cooperation
with a state power they will not acknowledge. The latter
tendency is aware that this attitude makes it difficult to
fight the current economic demands, but will not let the
short-term economic demands outweigh the political demands
of the working class. This opposition in the working class
grew stronger through the 60's, and developed both within
the Peronist trade union movement and in the organization of
class struggle-oriented trade unions - gremios clasistas -
that were not Peronist-dominated. However, the key union
leaders in the CGT have historically predominantly advocated
various forms of cooperation with the military. Either by
declared support or by seeking forms of "peaceful
coexistence" for the mutual benefit of the trade union
bureaucrats and the military. Especially in the period
1966-73, the central leadership of the CGT revealed
themselves as clear worker aristocrats who did everything
they could to curb the mass mobilizations against the
military regime. During this period, therefore, a strong
opposition trade union movement emerged - both within
Peronism (CGT de los argentinos, the CGT of the
Argentinians) and outside (including gremios clasistas,
class unions).
The Peronists were still banned in the late 50's. Yet it
was their voices that in 1958 brought them progress-oriented
Arturo Frondizi to power. He opened the country to the
multinational oil companies and car factories, and
implemented an economic policy involving a rapid
concentration of wealth and aggravated social conflicts.
Frondizi abolished the band listing of the Peronists who, in
the 1962 parliamentary elections, prevailed in 10 provinces.
This triggered a new military intervention in political
life. Frondizi was removed, and after two violent clashes
between sectors of the armed forces, General Juan Carlos
Onganía emerged as the victor. He once again banished
Peronism and handed over the government to the radical
Arturo Illia, whose government was the first in four decades
not to introduce state of emergency or other repression
measures. Illia canceled the oil contracts Frondizi had
signed and paid compensation to the foreign companies
concerned. Several good harvest results and the opening of
commercial relations with the socialist countries helped to
overcome the crisis the military intervention had triggered.
Illia refused to contribute Argentine forces to the US
invasion of Santo Domingo in 1965, but at the same time his
entire reign was marked by clashes with the Peronist unions
that carried out strikes, mobilizations and factory
occupations.
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